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BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF 
FEMINIST ANTI-CENSORSHIP 
TASKFORCE, ET AL., IN AMERICAN 
BOOKSELLERS ASSOCIATION v. 
HUDNUT 
Nan D. Hunter* and Sylvia A. Law** 
The document that follows represents both a legal brief and a 
political statement. It was written for two purposes: to mobilize, 
in a highly visible way, a broad spectrum of feminist opposition 
to the enactment of laws expanding state suppression of sexually 
explicit material; and to place before the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit a cogent legal argument for the constitu-
tional invalidity of an Indianapolis municipal ordinance that 
would have permitted private civil suits to ban such material, 
purportedly to protect women. 1 Drafting this brief was one of 
• Director, American Civil Liberties Union Projects on Lesbian and Gay Rights, and 
on AIDS and Civil Liberties. B.A., Northwestern University, 1971; J.D., Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center, 1975. 
•• Director, Arthur Garfield Hays Civil Liberties Program and Professor of Law, New 
York University School of Law. B.A., Antioch College, 1964; J.D., New York University 
School of Law, 1968. MacArthur Prize Fellow. 
1. The ordinance states: 
Pornography shall mean the sexually explicit subordination of women, graphi-
cally depicted, whether in pictures or in words, that also includes one or more of 
the following: 
(1) Women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or 
(2) Women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in 
being raped; or 
(3) Women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or 
bruised or physically hurt, or as dismembered or truncated or fragmented 
or severed into body parts; or 
(4) Women are presented being penetrated by objects or animals; or 
(5) Women are presented in scenarios of degredation [sic], injury, abasement, 
torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context 
that makes these conditions sexual; [or] 
(6) Women are presented as sexual objects for domination, conquest, violation, 
exploitation, possession, or use, or through postures or positions of servility 
or submission or display. 
INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE § 16-3(q) (1984). 
The Court of Appeals held that the Indianapolis ordinance violated the first amend-
ment, and the Supreme Court affirmed that ruling without issuing an opinion. American 
Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). It 
appears that the Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce (FACT) analysis had some influ-
ence on Judge Easterbrook's approach to the constitutional issues presented. The opin-
69 
70 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 21:1 & 2 
the most demanding and exhilarating assignments either author 
has yet undertaken. 
The brief was written on behalf of the Feminist Anti-Censor-
ship Taskforce (FACT) and was co-signed by the Women's Le-
gal Defense Fund (WLDF) and eighty individual feminists. The 
analysis of sexuality underlying the brief flows directly from a 
long tradition of nineteenth-century women's rights activists 
who sought sexual self-determination as an essential aspect of 
full liberation. From the beginning, others within the early femi-
nist movement opposed this understanding of feminism because 
they viewed sexuality as a realm in which women often suffered. 
To protect women, they sought to restrict male sexual freedom 
by imposing on men the standard of sexual purity already ap-
plied to women. 2 
The modern feminist movement has continued this divergence 
of viewpoint. Simone de Beauvoir, for example, saw the erotic as 
an aspect of human liberty and insisted that sexual self-determi-
nation constitutes a fundamental part of women's liberation.3 
Since 1966, women's demands have included calls for greater 
sexual freedom for women and an end to double standards.' At 
the same time, the movement has fought for and won a number 
of reforms to curb rape and other violence directed pointedly at 
women.11 A part of the feminist antiviolence movement evolved 
first into a campaign aimed at depictions of violence against 
women in a variety of media and then into a campaign aimed at 
all pornographic imagery, whether violent or not. 6 
ion discusses concrete examples illustrating the difficulty of distinguishing images that 
liberate women from those that subordinate women. Id. at 330. It addresses the relation-
ship between images, ideas, and behavior, and the distinction between fantasy and real-
ity, in terms that are unusually rich and thoughtful for a judicial opinion. Id. The court 
rightly rejects the state's claim that pornography is "low value" speech, entitled to lesser 
constitutional protection than "serious" talk about public issues. Id. at 331. 
2. DuBois & Gordon, Seeking Ecstasy on the Battlefield: Danger and Pleasure in 
Nineteenth-Century Feminist Sexual Thought, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING 
FEMALE SEXUALITY 31 (C. Vance ed. 1984) [hereinafter PLEASURE AND DANGER). 
3. S. DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 202-03, 366-413 (H. Parshley trans., 5th printing 
1968). 
4. See Hunter, The Pornography Debate in Context: A Chronology of Sexuality, 
Media & Violence Issues in Feminism, in CAUGHT LOOKING: FEMINISM, PORNOGRAPHY & 
CENSORSHIP 26 (1986) [hereinafter CAUGHT LOOKING); Snitow, Stansell & Thompson, In-
troduction, in PowERS OF DESIRE: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY 9 (A. Snitow, C. Stansell & 
S. Thompson eds. 1983) [hereinafter POWERS OF DESIRE). 
5. See S. SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF 
THE BATTERED WOMEN'S MOVEMENT (1982). 
6. See Snitow, Retrenchment Versus Transformation: The Politics of the Anti-
pornography Movement, in CAUGHT LOOKING, supra note 4, at 10, and in WOMEN 
AGAINST CENSORSHIP 107 (V. Burstyn ed. 1985). 
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Meanwhile, as feminist discourse on issues of sexuality be-
came more elaborate, conservative forces also mobilized around 
issues of sexual imagery. An alliance of traditional moralists, the 
New Right, and some feminists promoted and defended the In-
dianapolis ordinance.7 In the current political environment, the 
conservative voices are plainly more powerful than those of the 
feminists. For conservatives, the current interest in suppression 
of pornography forms part of a larger agenda to reverse recent 
feminist gains through a moral ·crusade against abortion, lesbian 
and gay rights, contraceptive education and services, and 
women's fragile economic achievements. Conservatives and reli-
gious fundamentalists oppose pornography because it appears to 
depict and approve of sex outside marriage and procreation. The 
Right seeks to use legitimate f ~inist concern about sexual vio-
lence and oppression to reinstate traditional sexual arrange-
ments and the formerly inexorable link between reproduction 
and sexuality. 
In 1985, conservative efforts to focus attention on suppression 
of sexual imagery culminated in Attorney General William 
French Smith's establishment of a Commission on Pornography 
charged to find "more effective ways in which the spread of por-
nography could be contained."8 Because most Americans do not 
share the moral view that confines sex to a solely procreative 
role, the Commission's mission was to modernize the assault on 
sexually explicit images by demonstrating that pornography 
causes violence. Despite the number of members chosen with a 
history of vehement opposition to sexually explicit material9 and 
7. Duggan, Censorship in the Name of Feminism, Village Voice, Oct. 16, 1984, at 11, 
col. I. The ordinance was introduced in the Indianapolis City Council by a member 
whose career was founded on anti-ERA organizing. Id. at 12, col. I. The central popular 
support for its passage came from fundamentalists who attended the meetings at which 
the Council voted on the ordinance. The Reverend Greg Dixon of the Indianapolis Bap-
tist Temple, a former Moral Majority official, organized the fundamentalist presence. Id. 
at 16, col. 1. 
8. 2 ATIORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., FINAL RE-
PORT app. A, at 1957 (1986) [hereinafter COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY]. 
9. The Commission was chaired by Henry Hudson, a prosecutor whom President 
Reagan praised for closing down every adult bookstore in Arlington, Va. At least six of 
the 11 Commission members had previously taken strong public stands opposing pornog-
raphy and supporting obscenity laws as a means of control. B. LYNN, POLLUTING THE 
CENSORSHIP DEBATE: A SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE OF THE FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY 14-16 (1986) (ACLU Public Policy Report); 
Vance, The Meese Commission on the Road, NATION, Aug. 2, 1986, at 76 (also listing 
Commission member Frederick Schauer as having taken a public stand opposing pornog-
raphy). For example, Commission member Dr. James Dobson is President of Focus on 
the Family, an organization that is "dedicated to the preservation of the home and the 
family and the traditional values growing out of the Judeo-Christian ethic." B. LYNN, 
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tight control of the witness list, 10 the Commission was unable to 
"prove" that pornography causes violence. 
Social scientists, whose work the antipornography movement 
had previously utilized, refused in their testimony to draw the 
simple connections between pornography and violence that the 
Commission sought.11 Like FACT, these researchers urged the 
use of caution in the extension of artificial laboratory findings to 
naturalistic settings. Further, they testified that aggressive im-
agery and the mainstream media present more worrisome con-
cerns than sexual imagery and X-rated channels.12 Unable to 
marshal systemic evidence that pornography causes concrete in-
jury, the Commission was forced to rely upon the anecdotal tes-
timony of carefully selected and well-prepared individual vic-
tims13 and to invoke a vastly broadened concept of "harm."14 
Perhaps the most significant and most telling aspect of the 
Commission's work was its inability to agree on a definition of 
pornography.111 Undaunted, the Commission concluded that 
most commercially available pornography is "degrading" and 
contains "characteristics of degradation, domination, subordina-
tion, and humiliation," particularly of women.16 An earlier draft 
supra, at 15. In addition, Commission member Frederick Schauer had previously argued 
for a highly restricted application of the first amendment. Id. at 17; Schauer, Speech and 
"Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity": An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitu-
tional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899, 922-23 (1979). 
The three people without prior established positions on pornography frequently re-
sisted the staff's agenda. They endorsed a statement that said that while they abhorred 
"the exploitation of vulnerable people" in pornography, they also rejected "judgmental 
and condescending efforts to speak on women's behalf as though they were helpless, 
mindless children." 1 CoMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 194 (statement of Dr. 
Judith Becker, Ellen Levine, and Deanne Tilton-Durfee). Two of these three women dis-
sented from the final report. See id. at 195-212 (statement of Dr. Judith Becker and 
Ellen Levine). 
10. Over three-fourths of the witnesses urged tighter controls over sexually explicit 
materials. B. LYNN, supra note 9, at 7. 
11. See generally id. at 57-88. Prof. Edward Donnerstein has denounced as "bizarre" 
the Commission's effort to use his research to buttress a claim that sexually violent ma-
terial causes criminal behavior. Goleman, Researchers Dispute Pornography Report on 
Its Use of Data, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1986, at Al, col. 1. 
12. Vance, supra note 9, at 79. 
13. See 1 CoMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 322-49. With respect to materi-
als regarded by the Commission as nonviolent but degrading, the Commission acknowl-
edged that there was little concrete evidence "causally linking the material with sexual 
aggression" but nonetheless concluded that the "absence of evidence should by no means 
be taken to deny the existence of the causal link." Id. at 332. 
14. "[T]he most important harms must be seen in moral terms, and the action of 
moral condemnation of that which is immoral is not merely important but essential." Id. 
at 303~ 
15. Id. at 227-32. 
16. See id. at 331. 
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of the Commission report had even offered examples of such ma-
terial.17 For the final report, however, the Commission also 
found itself unable to agree on examples of "degradation."18 
The Meese Commission recommended new federal and state 
legislation and increased prosecution to suppress sexually ex-
plicit materials to the maximum extent constitutionally possi-
ble.19 Unfortunately, it failed to embrace the recommendation of 
the 1970 Commission on Obscenity and Pornography20 to com-
mence a serious sex education effort to empower young people to 
develop a healthy and balanced view of sexuality that would en-
able them to avoid unwanted pregnancy and sexually transmit-
ted diseases. The Meese Commission did not recommend 
strengthening federal law to prohibit sexual harassment in the 
workplace. 21 It did not call for legislation to remove spousal im-
munity in sexual assault cases or for funding to improve law en-
forcement against domestic violence. 
At the level of popular opinion, little support seems to exist 
for either conservative or feminist campaigns against sexual im-
agery. Press reaction to the Meese Commission report was uni-
formly negative.22 In 1985, voters in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
17. B. LYNN, supra note 9, at 71-72. These examples included: 
[Djepictions of a woman lying on the ground while two standing men ejaculate 
on her; two women engaged in sexual activity with each other while a man looks 
on and masturbates; a woman non-physically coerced into engaging in sexual 
ac~ivity with a male authority figure, such as a boss, teacher, or priest, and then 
begs for more; . . . a woman with legs spread wide open holding her labia open 
with her fingers; a man shaving the hair from the pubic area of a woman; a 
woman dressed in a dog costume being penetrated from the rear by a man . . . . 
Id. at 71-72. 
18. Id. at 72. 
19. Two Commission members, both women, filed a sharp and cogent dissent. 1 
CoMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 8, at 195-212 (statement of Dr. Judith Becker and 
Ellen Levine). 
20. COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY & PORNOGRAPHY, THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON 
OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY (1970). 
21. For a case illustrating an inadequacy of the present antidiscrimination law, see 
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 622 (1986) (holding that posters of nude 
women on workplace walls and supervisors' obscene comments do not constitute actiona-
ble sexual harassment). 
22. P. NOBILE & E. NADLER, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. SEX: How THE MEESE 
COMMISSION LIED ABOUT PORNOGRAPHY 224-25 (1986). The New York Times opined, 
"[T]he report, widely circulated without formal publication, must be faulted for relying 
on questionable evidence and recklessly encouraging censorship." Defeated by Pornugra· 
phy, N.Y. Times, June 21, 1986, at Al6, col. 1. Washington Post columnist William 
Raspberry praised the dissenting Commissioners for their "intellectual honesty, profes-
sional integrity and guts," and their refusal to be "buffaloed into unsupported conclu-
sions." Raspberry, Pornography Report, Wash. Post, May 26, 1986, at A21, col. 4. An-
other Washington Post columnist, Richard Cohen, ridiculed the Commission's discovery 
of a causal link between pornography and violence as "more a wish than a scientific 
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rejected, by a wide margin, a public referendum on an ordinance 
similar to the one adopted in Indianapolis. 23 A broad range of 
feminist organizations opposed the ordinance.2• In 1986, citizens 
of Maine voted nearly three-to-one against adoption of an ob-
scenity law;211 women's organizations in Maine strongly opposed 
the proposal. 26 
The feminists of FACT have helped to transform the contem-
porary dialogue about pornography. That debate no longer pits 
victimized women and conventional moralists against 
pornographers and civil libertarians. FACT affirms that sexual-
ity is, for women, a source of pleasure and power, as well as a 
realm of danger and oppression. As a consequence, discussion of 
pornography and sexuality is more intricately contextualized 
and appropriately complex. The brief that follows aspires to 
keep open the discussion about sexual explicitness and to assert 
that sexually explicit materials have both liberating and repres-
sive qualities. The feminist analysis of these issues remains far 
from complete. As Carole S. Vance, one of the founders of 
FACT, observes, "The hallmark of sexuality is its complexity: its 
multiple meanings, sensations, and connections."27 
Despite the contradictory strands in the feminist approach, 
the empirical and intellectual exploration of sexuality remains a 
finding." Cohen, Pornography: The 'Causal Link,' Wash. Post, June 3, 1986, at A19, col. 
2. Chicago Tribune columnist Mike Royko observed: 
[I]n recent years there have been more than 220 bombings of abortion clin-
ics. . . . Those who have been arrested have expressed deep religious 
convictions. . . . 
(E]xtremist groups shoot rural sheriffs, talk show hosts and lawyers they sus-
pect of being liberal. They, too, spout religious devotion. 
So maybe we should begin considering the outlawing of religion because it is 
the root cause of so much violence. 
Royko, Nobody Euer Got Raped by a Book, Chicago Trib., June 11, 1986, at 1, col. 3. 
23. Anti-Pornography Law Defeated in Cambridge, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1985, at 
A16, col. 6. 
24. FACT, Boston Chapter; The Boston Women's Health Book Collective; Boston 
NOW; Women Against Violence Against Women, Boston Chapter; Cambridge Commis-
sion on the Status of Women; No Bad Women, Just Bad Laws (statements on file with 
the U. MICH. J.L. REF.). 
25. Wald, Voters in Maine Defeat Anti-Obscenity Plan, N.Y. Times, June 11, 1986, 
at A32, col. 4. For ballot purposes, the four-and-a-half-page statute was reduced to the 
proposition, "Do you want to make it a crime to make, sell, give for value or otherwise 
promote obscene material in Maine?" Id. 
26. Wald, Obscenity Debate Focuses Attention on Maine, Where Voters Weigh Is-
sue, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1986, at Al8, col. 1. 
27. Vance, Pleasure and Danger: Toward a Politics of Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND 
DANGER, supra note 2, at 5. 
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central enterprise for the contemporary feminist movement. 28 
Sexual ideas, images, and practices have been dominated by and 
oriented toward men and are often not responsive to women.29 
Many women experience sexual failure and frustration, rather 
than ecstasy and pleasure. Furthermore, feminism's core insight 
emphasizes that gender is socially defined. Social and sexual role 
acculturation largely determine gender differences; accordingly, 
these differences are not natural or immutable. In Simone de 
Beauvoir's classic words, "One is not born, but rather becomes, a 
woman. "30 Social ideas and material arrangements give deep 
meaning to masculinity and femininity. The social significance 
of gender is fabricated to favor men systematically through eco-
nomic, political, and legal structures that rest upon and rein-
force gender. Sexual desire, both powerful and pliable, forms a 
part of that gender system. Discovering, describing, and analyz-
ing the complex interaction of gender and sexuality, of represen-
tation and reality, thus remains a key project of feminist theory 
and lives. 
28. For three excellent feminist collections, see POWERS OF DESIRE, supra note 4; 
PLEASURE AND DANGER, supra note 2; WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP, supra note 6. 
29. See Keodt, The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm, in NOTES FROM THE SECOND YEAR: 
WOMEN'S LIBERATION 37 (S. Firestone ed. 1970), and in VOICES FROM WoMEN's LIBERA-
TION 158 (L. Tanner ed. 1971); M. SHERFEY, THE NATURE AND EVOLUTION OF FEMALE SEX-
UALITY (1972); L. BARBACH, FOR YOURSELF: THE FULFILLMENT OF FEMALE SEXUALITY 
(1971). 
30. S. DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 3, at 273. 
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Amici are feminists who sign this brief as a statement of our 
opposition to the Indianapolis ordinance. We believe that the or-
dinance reinforces rather than undercuts central sexist stereo-
types in our society and would result in state suppression of sex-
ually explicit speech, including feminist images and literature, 
which does not in any way encourage violence against women. 
We condemn acts of violence against women; incitement to that 
violence; and misogyny, racism, and anti-semitism in all media. 
We believe, however, that the Indianapolis ordinance will not re-
duce violence against women and will censor speech and imagery 
that properly belong in the public realm. Some proponents of 
this ordinance genuinely believed that it would assist women to 
overcome disabling sex role stereotypes and promote greater 
equality for women. We who sign this brief are deeply concerned 
that it will have precisely the opposite effect. 
THE FEMINIST ANTI-CENSORSHIP TASKFORCE 
(FACT) is a group of women long active in the feminist move-
ment who organized in 1984 to oppose the enactment of Indian-
apolis-style antipornography laws. It is composed of community 
activists, writers, artists and teachers. 
THE WOMEN'S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, Inc. (WLDF) is 
a non-profit tax-exempt organization of over 1500 members 
founded to further women's rights and to challenge sex-based 
inequities through the law, especially in the area of employment 
discrimination and domestic relations. WLDF volunteer and 
staff attorneys conduct public education about women's rights 
and sex discrimination; counsel thousands of individual women 
annually about their rights; represent victims of sex discrimina-
tion in selected precedent-setting cases; and advocate on behalf 
of laws guaranteeing sex-based equality before legislative and 
executive branch policymakers and as amicus curiae in numer-
ous court cases. 
ROBERTA ACHTENBERG is the Directing Attorney of the 
Lesbian Rights Project in San Francisco and the Editor of Sex-
ual Orientation and the Law (Clark Boardman 1985). She was 
formerly Dean of New College of California School of Law. 
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DENNIS ALTMAN is a Policy Fellow, University of Califor-
nia at San Francisco, in the Institute for Health Policy Studies 
and is the author of four books. He was Regents lecturer, Uni-
versity of California at Santa Cruz, 1983. 
NANCY K. BEREANO is Editor and Publisher of Firebrand 
Books. Prior to that position, she was Editor of the Feminist 
Series for Crossing Press. 
JOAN E. BIREN (JEB) is a freelance photographer and the 
author of Eye to Eye: Portraits of Lesbians. She has been a fem-
inist activist for fifteen years. 
BETTY BROOKS, Ed. D., is the Director of the Southern 
California Rape Hotline Alliance Self-Defense Certification Pro-
gram, a member of the American College of Sexologists, and 
founder of Women Against Sexual Abuse. She recently organ-
ized a FACT chapter in Los Angeles. 
RITA MAE BROWN is a well-known author whose works in-
clude Rubyfruit Jungle, Southern Discomfort, and Sudden 
Death. 
ARLENE CARMEN is Program Associate at Judson Memo-
rial Church in New York City, where she directs a minis1;,ry to 
street prostitutes. She is co-author of Abortion Counseling and 
Social Change (Judson Press 1973) and Working Women: The 
Subterranean World of Street Prostitution, scheduled to be pub-
lished in August 1985. 
DENISE S. CARTY-BENNIA is a Professor of Law, North-
eastern University School of Law, and an active participant in 
movements opposing sex and race discrimination in the United 
States. 
CHERYL L. CLARKE is a Black feminist lesbian poet, 
writer, and member of the editorial collective of Conditions 
Magazine. 
MICHELLE CLIFF is the author of Claiming an Identity 
They Taught Me to Despise and Abeng. She is a member of 
Poets & Writers and The Authors Guild. 
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THE EDITORS OF CONDITIONS MAGAZINE-Founded 
in 1976, Conditions magazine is a feminist magazine of writing 
by women with an emphasis on writing by lesbians. The current 
editors are Dorothy Allison, Cheryl Clarke, Nancy Clarke Otter, 
and Debby Schaubman. 
RHONDA COPELON is an Associate Professor of Law, City 
University of New York Law School at Queens College. For the 
past fifteen years, she has litigated civil rights and women's 
rights cases as an attorney with the Center for Constitutional 
Rights. 
ROSEMARY DANIELL is a full-time writer. Her books in-
clude A Sexual Tour of the Deep South (poetry, 1975); Fatal 
Flowers: On Sin, Sex, and Suicide in the Deep South (non-fic-
tion, 1980); and Sleeping with Soldiers (non-fiction, 1985). 
PEGGY C. DAVIS, Assistant Professor, New York University 
Law School, is a former Judge of the New York Family Court 
and has worked in many efforts for racial and gender equality. 
JOHN D'EMILIO, Ph. D., is an Assistant Professor of History 
at the University of North Carolina in Greensboro and the au-
thor of Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities (University of Chi-
cago Press 1983). 
BETTY DODSON is an artist, writer, publisher, and teacher. 
She has spent eleven years organizing sexual enhancement work-
shops for women. Her book, Self-Love and Orgasm, has sold 
200,000 copies. 
MARY C. DUNLAP is a law teacher and solo practitioner of 
civil law. She was co-founder and attorney-teacher at Equal 
Right Advocates, Inc., San Francisco, from 1973 to 1978. She is 
co-author of a chapter on the First Amendment in Sexual Orien-
tation and the Law (Clark Boardman 1985). 
THOMAS I. EMERSON, Lines Professor of Law, Emeritus, 
Yale University School of Law, has written extensively on the 
First Amendment and is co-author of The Equal Rights Amend-
ment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 
Yale L.J. 871 (1971). 
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SUSAN ESTRICH, Assistant Professor of Law, Harvard Law 
School, has written in the area of sex discrimination. 
MARY L. FARMER is a lesbian feminist activist and book-
store owner in Washington, D.C. 
ANNE. FREEDMAN, Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School, 
Camden, was a co-founder of the Women's Law Project, Phila-
delphia. She is co-author of The Equal Rights Amendment: A 
Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 Yale L.J. 
871 (1971), and of Sex Discrimination and the Law: Causes and 
Remedies (1975). 
ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN is Associate Professor of History 
at Stanford University and Director of the Feminist Studies 
Program there. She is the author of Their Sisters' Keepers, a 
history of women's prison reform, and of articles on the history 
of sexuality. 
BETTY FRIEDAN is the author of The Feminine Mystique 
and The Second Stage. She was founding president of the Na-
tional Organization for Women, a founding member of the Na-
tional Women's Political Caucus, and is presently co-chair of the 
National Commission for Women's Equality of the American 
Jewish Congress. 
JEWELLE L. GOMEZ is a critic for the Village Voice, Wel-
lesley Women's Review of Books, and Hurricane Alice (in Min-
neapolis). She is a Program Associate for the New York State 
Council on the Arts. 
BETTE GORDON is an Assistant Professor of Film at Hof-
stra University in New York and an independent filmmaker. Her 
work has been exhibited at international film festivals in 
Cannes, Berlin, Florence, and Los Angeles, and is currently fea-
tured in New York, Paris, and Sydney, Australia. 
LINDA GORDON is a Professor of History at the University 
of Wisconsin-Madison. She is the author of Woman's Body, 
Woman's Right: A History of Birth Control in the US, America's 
Working Women, and of numerous articles on the history of 
feminism and on family violence and the feminist response. 
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VIVIAN GORNICK is a feminist author and journalist whose 
works include Woman in Sexist Society: Essays in Feminism, In 
Search of Ali Mahmoud: An American Woman in Egypt, and 
Women in Science. 
LYNN A. HAANEN is serving her third term on the Dane 
County (Wisconsin) Board of Supervisors and is a co-founder of 
FACT in Madison, Wisconsin, formed to raise concerns about 
antipornography and censorship measures. 
CAROLYN HEILBRUN is Professor of English at Columbia 
University and an author. 
DONNA J. HITCHENS is an attorney now in private practice 
in San Francisco, formerly the Directing Attorney of the Lesbian 
Rights Project and a staff attorney with Equal Rights 
Advocates. 
AMBER HOLLIBAUGH was a founding member of the first 
Boston battered women's shelter and an organizer with Califor-
nians for Education Against the Briggs Initiative/Prop 6. 
JOAN W. HOWARTH is currently the police practices attor-
ney for the ACLU Foundation of Southern California. In 1976, 
she helped to establish Women Against Violence Against 
Women (WAVA W) and was active in that group until 1982. 
DAVID KAIRYS is a writer, teacher, and attorney in Phila-
delphia and editor of The Politics of Law. 
E. ANN KAPLAN is an Associate Professor at Rutgers Uni-
versity, where she teaches literature and film. She is the author 
of Women and Film: Both Sides of the Camera (Methuen 1983) 
and of other books and articles dealing with women's studies. 
JONATHAN N. KATZ is the author of Gay American History 
and the Gay/Lesbian Almanac. 
VIRGINIA KERR is Assistant Professor of Law at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law School. 
NORMAN LAURILA co-owns and manages a gay and lesbian 
bookstore in New York City called "A Different Light," which 
also has a branch in Los Angeles. 
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HOW ARD LESNICK is a Distinguished Professor of Law, 
City University of New York Law School at Queens College. 
LONG HAUL PRESS is a lesbian-feminist press in New 
York. 
PHYLLIS LYON, Ed. D.; is co-author of Lesbian/Woman. 
She is a Human Rights Commissioner in San Francisco and a 
professor at the Institute for Advanced Study in Human 
Sexuality. 
DEL MARTIN is the author of Battered Wives. She is also a 
member of the California Commission on Crime Control and Vi-
olence Prevention. 
JUDITH McDANIEL, Ph. D., is a poet, novelist, teacher, and 
political activist. She is Program Director for the Albany, N.Y. 
Non-Violence Project. 
KATE MILLETT is the author of Sexual Politics, The Prosti-
tution Papers, Flying, and Sita. 
JOAN NESTLE is a writer and co-founder of the Lesbian 
Herstory Educational Foundation, Inc./The Lesbian Herstory 
Archives. For the last nineteen years she has taught writing in 
the SEEK Program at Queens College and at the City Univer-
sity of New York. 
ESTHER NEWTON, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of An-
thropology and Coordinator of Women's Studies, State Univer-
sity of New York College at Purchase. 
LYNN M. PALTROW is an attorney working at the National 
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The instant case involves the constitutionality of an anti-por-
nography ordinance enacted by the City Council of Indianapolis, 
City-County Ordinance No. 35, 1984. The ordinance was ruled 
unconstitutional by the U.S. District Court on a motion for sum-
mary judgment. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. 
Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984). 
Amici believe that the ordinance violates both the First 
Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech and the Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantee of equal treatment under the law. Under 
its trafficking provision, the ordinance would allow injunctions 
to issue against the distribution, sale, exhibition or production of 
any sexually explicit materials Which fall within its definition of 
pornography. No showing of harm to the plaintiff (individual or 
class) is required as proof prior to the issuance of such an in-
junction. Because the trafficking provision and the definition 
most flagrantly violate constitutional principles, this brief con-
centrates its focus on those two aspects of the ordinance. 
xxm 
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I. THE ORDINANCE SUPPRESSES CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED 
SPEECH IN A MANNER PARTICULARLY DETRIMENTAL TO WOMEN. 
Although Appellants argue that the ordinance is designed to 
restrict images which legitimate violence and coercion against 
women, the definition of pornography in the ordinance is not 
limited to images of violence or of coercion, or to images pro-
duced by women who were coerced. Nor is it limited to materials 
which advocate or depict the torture or rape of women as a form 
of sexual pleasure. It extends to any sexually explicit material 
which an agency or court finds to be "subordinating" to a claim-
ant acting on behalf of women and which fits within one of the 
descriptive categories which complete the definition of 
pornography. 
For purposes of the trafficking cause of action, the ordinance 
defines pornography as the "graphic sexually explicit subordina-
tion of women, whether in pictures or in words, that also in-
cludes one or more" of the depictions described in six catego-
ries.1 The violent and brutal images which Appellants use as 
illustrative examples2 cannot obscure the fact that the ordinance 
1. (1) Women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or 
(2) Women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in be-
ing raped; or 
(3) Women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut up or mutilated or 
bruised or physically hurt, or as dismembered or truncated or fragmented or 
severed into body parts; or 
(4) Women are presented being penetrated by objects or animals; or 
(5) Women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, abasement, torture, 
shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes 
these conditions sexual; or 
(6) Women are presented as sexual objects for domination, conquest, violation, 
exploitation, possession, or use, or through postures or positions of servility or 
submission or display. 
Indianapolis, Ind., Code § 16-3(q) (1984). 
2. By the use of highly selected examples, Appellants and supporting amici convey 
the impression that the great majority of materials considered pornographic are brutal. 
Although most commercial pornography, like much of all media, is sexist, most is not 
violent. A study of pictorials and cartoons in Playboy and Penthouse between 1973 and 
1977 found that, by 1977, about 5% of the pictorials were rated as sexually violent. "No 
significant changes in the percentage of sexually violent cartoons were found over the 
years." Malamuth & Spinner, A Longitudinal Content Analysis of Sexual Violence in the 
Best-Selling Erotic Magazines, 16 J. Sex. Research 226, 237 (1980). The Women Against 
Pornography (W.A.P.) amicus brief, in particular, totally mischaracterizes content analy-
ses of pornography. It asserts, at p. 8 n.14, that one study found the depictions of rape in 
"adults only" paperbacks had doubled from 1968 to 1974, a statement which is simply 
false. The study found that the amount of explicit sexual content had doubled, but also 
1 
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authorizes suppression of material that is sexually explicit, but 
in no way violent. The language of the definition mixes phrases 
that have clear meanings and thus ascertainable applications 
(e.g., "cut up or mutilated") with others which are sufficiently 
elastic to encompass almost any sexually explicit image that 
someone might find offensive (e.g., "scenarios of degradation" or 
"abasement"). The material that could be suppressed under the 
latter category is virtually limitless. 
While the sweep of the ordinance is breathtaking, it does not 
address (nor would Amici support state suppression of) the far 
more pervasive commercial images depicting women as primarily 
concerned with the whiteness of their wash, the softness of their 
toilet tissue, and whether the lines of their panties show when 
wearing tight slacks. Commercial images, available to the most 
impressionable young children during prime time, depict women 
as people interested in inconsequential matters who are incapa-
ble of taking significant, serious roles in societal decision-
making. 
The constitutionality of the ordinance depends on the as-
sumption that state agencies and courts can develop clear legal 
definitions of terms like "sexually explicit subordination," "sex-
ual object," and "scenarios of degradation" and "abasement." In 
truth, these terms are highly contextual and of varying mean-
ings. Worse, many of their most commonly accepted meanings 
would, if applied in the context of this ordinance, reinforce 
rather than erode archaic and untrue stereotypes about women's 
sexuality. 
"that the plots, themes, and stories have remained much the same in these books 
throughout the years measured in this study." Smith, The Social Content of Pornogra-
phy, 26 J. Comm. 16, 23 (1976). The brief then cites a study finding that depictions of 
bondage and domination in Times Square pornography stores "had increased dramati-
cally in frequency by 1982," but neglects to mention that the increase was to 17.2%. The 
same study also concluded that "many bondage and domination magazines do not depict 
suffering or bodily injury." Dietz & Evans, Pornographic Imagery and Prevalence of 
Paraphilia, 139 Am. J. Psychiatry 1493, 1495 (1982). That some pornography would be 
found by amici on both sides to be offensive to women does not support this legislative 
approach to curtailing that pornography, which is overbroad and dependent on suppres-
sion of speech. 
2 
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A. Historically the Law Has Incorporated a Sexual Double 
Standard Denying Women's Interest in Sexual Expression. 
Traditionally, laws regulating sexual activity were premised 
upon and reinforced a gender-based double standard which 
assumed: 
that women are delicate, that voluntary sexual inter-
course may harm them in certain circumstances and that 
they may be seriously injured by words as well as deeds. 
The statutes also suggest that, despite the generally deli-
cate nature of most women, there exists a class of women 
who are not delicate or who are not worthy of protection. 
[By contrast, the law's treatment of male sexuality re-
flected] the underlying assumption that only males have 
aggressive sexual desires [and] hence they must be re-
strained . . . . The detail and comprehensiveness of 
[such] laws suggest that men are considered almost 
crazed by sex. 
K. Davidson, R. Ginsburg & H. Kay, Sex-Based Discrimination 
892 (1st ed. 1974). 
The Indianapolis ordinance is squarely within the tradition of 
the sexual double standard. It allows little room for women to 
openly express certain sexual desires and resurrects the notion 
that sexually explicit materials are subordinating and degrading 
to women. Because the "trafficking" cause of action allows one 
woman to obtain a court order suppressing images which fall 
within the ordinance's definition of pornography, it implies that 
individual women are incapable of choosing for themselves what 
they consider to be enjoyable, sexually arousing material without 
being degraded or humiliated. 
The legal system has used many vehicles to enforce the sexual 
double standard which protected "good" women from both sex-
ual activity and explicit speech about sex. For example, the com-
mon law of libel held that "an oral imputation of unchastity to a 
woman is actionable without proof of damage. . . . Such a rule 
never has been applied to a man, since the damage to his repu-
tation is assumed not to be as great." W. Prosser, Law of Torts, 
759-60 (1971). 
The common law also reinforced the image of "good" women 
as asexual and vulnerable by providing the husband, but not the 
3 
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wife, remedies for "interference" with his right to sole possession 
of his wife's body and services. The early writ of "ravishment" 
listed the wife with the husband's chattels. To this day, the ac-
tion for criminal conversation allows the husband to maintain an 
action for trespass, not only when his wife is raped 
but also even though the wife had consented to it, or was 
herself the seducer and had invited and procured it, since 
it was considered that she was no more capable of giving 
a consent which would prejudice the husband's interests 
than was his horse . 
Id. at 874-77. 
While denying the possibility that "good" women could be 
sexual, the common law dealt harshly with the "bad" women 
who were. Prostitution laws often penalized only the woman, 
and not the man, and even facially neutral laws were and are 
enforced primarily against women. See, e.g., Jennings, The Vic-
tim as Criminal: A Consideration of California's Prostitution 
Law, 64 Calif. L. Rev. 1235 (1976). Prostitution is defined as 
"the practice of a female offering her body to indiscriminate sex-
ual intercourse with men," 63 Am. Jur. 2d Prostitution § 1 
(1972), or submitting "to indiscriminate sexual intercourse 
which she invites or solicits." Id. A woman who has sexual rela-
tions with many men is a "common prostitute" and a criminal 
while a sexually active man is considered normal. 
The sexual double standard is applied with particular force to 
young people. Statutory rape laws often punished men for con-
sensual intercourse with a female under a certain age. Comment, 
The Constitutionality of Statutory Rape Laws, 27 UCLA L. Rev. 
757, 762 (1980). Such laws reinforce the stereotype that in sex 
the man is the offender and the woman the victim, and that 
young men may legitimately engage in sex, at least with older 
people, while a young woman may not legally have sex with 
anyone. 
The suppression of sexually explicit material most devastating 
to women was the restriction on dissemination of birth control 
information, common until 1971. In that year, the Supreme 
Court held that the constitutional right to privacy protects an 
unmarried person's right to access to birth control information. 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). To deny women access 
to contraception "prescribe[s] pregnancy and the birth of an un-
4 
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wanted child as punishment for fornication." Id. at 448. For the 
previous century, the federal Comstock law, passed in 1873, had 
prohibited mailing, transporting or importing "obscene, lewd or 
lascivious" items, specifically including all devices and informa-
tion pertaining to "preventing contraception and producing 
abortion."8 Women were jailed for distributing educational 
materials regarding birth control to other women because the 
materials were deemed sexually explicit in that they "con-
tain[ed] pictures of certain organs of women" and because the 
materials were found to be "detrimental to public morals and 
welfare." People v. Byrne, 99 Misc. 1, 6 (N.Y. 1917). 
The Mann Act also was premised on the notion that women 
require special protection from sexual activity. 35 Stat. 825 
(1910), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2422. It forbids interstate transporta-
tion of women for purposes of "prostitution, debauchery, or any 
other immoral purposes," and was enacted to protect women 
from reportedly widespread abduction by bands of "white 
slavers" coercing them into prostitution. As the legislative his-
tory reveals, the Act reflects the assumption that women have no 
will of their own and must be protected against themselves. See 
H.R. Rep. No. 47, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910), at 10-11. Like the 
premises underlying this ordinance, the Mann Act assumed 
that women were naturally chaste and virtuous, and that 
no woman became a whore unless she had first been 
raped, seduced, drugged or deserted. [Its] image of the 
prostitute . . . was of a lonely and confused fem ale . . . . 
[Its proponents] maintained that prostitutes were the 
passive victims of social disequilibrium and the brutality 
of men .... [Its] conception of female weakness and 
male domination left no room for the possibility that 
prostitutes might consciously choose their activities. 
3. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1461-1462 (West 1984); 19 U.S.C.A. § 1305 (West 1980 & Supp. 
1984); see United States v. One Obscene Book Entitled "Married Love", 48 F.2d 821 
(S.D.N.Y. 1931); United States v. One Book Entitled "Contraceptions", 51 F.2d 525 
(S.D.N.Y. 1931) (prosecution for distribution of books by Marie Stopes on contracep-
tion); United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930) (prosecution of Mary Ware 
Dennett for publication of pamphlet explaining sexual physiology and functions to chil-
dren); and Bours v. United States, 229 F. 960 (7th Cir. 1915) (prosecution of physician 
for mailing a letter indicating that he might perform a therapeutic abortion). It was not 
until 1971 that an amendment was passed deleting the prohibition as to contraception, 
Pub. L. No. 91-662, 84 Stat. 1973 (1971); and the ban as to abortion remains in the 
current codification of the law. 
5 
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Note, The White Slave Traffic Act: The Historical Impact of a 
Criminal Law Policy on Women, 72 Geo. L.J. 1111 (1984). 
The Mann Act initially defined a "white slave" to include 
"only those women or girls who are literally slaves-those 
women who are owned and held as property and chattels . . . 
those women and girls who, if given a fair chance, would, in all 
human probability, have been good wives and mothers," H.R. 
Rep. No. 47, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., at 9-10 (1910). Over the years, 
the interpretation and use of the Act changed drastically to pun-
ish voluntary "immoral" acts even when no commercial inten-
tion or business profit was involved. See Caminetti v. United 
States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 
14 (1946). 
The term 'other immoral acts' was held to apply to a va-
riety of activities: the interstate transportation of a wo-
man to work as a chorus girl in a theatre where the wo-
man was exposed to smoking, drinking, and cursing; a 
dentist who met his young lover in a neighboring state 
and shared a hotel room to discuss her pregnancy; two 
students at the University of Puerto Rico who had sexual 
intercourse on the way home from a date; and a man and 
woman who had lived together for four years and trav-
eled around the country as man and wife while the man 
sold securities. 
Note, supra, at 1119. 
Society's attempts to "protect" women's chastity through 
criminal and civil laws have resulted in restrictions on women's 
freedom to engage in sexual activity, to discuss it publicly, and 
to protect themselves from the risk of pregnancy. These disa-
bling restrictions reinforced the gender roles which have op-
pressed women for centuries. The Indianapolis ordinance reso-
nates with the traditional concept that sex itself degrades 
women, and its enforcement would reinvigorate those discrimi-
natory moral standards which have limited women's equality in 
the past. 
6 
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B. The Ordinance Is Unconstitutionally Vague Because Con-
text Inescapably Determines the Effect of Sexual Texts and 
Images. 
The ordinance authorizes court orders removing from public 
or private availability "graphic sexually explicit" words and 
images which "subordinate" women. A judge presented with a 
civil complaint filed pursuant to this law would be required to 
determine whether the material in question "subordinated" 
women. To equate pornography with conduct having the power 
to "subordinate" living human beings, whatever its value as a 
rhetorical device, requires a "certain sleight of hand" to be in-
corporated as a doctrine of law. American Booksellers Ass'n v. 
Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316, 1330 (S.D. Ind. 1984). Words and 
images do influence what people think, how they feel, and what 
they do, both positively and negatively. Thus pornography may 
have such influence. But the connection between fantasy or sym-
bolic representation and actions in the real world is not direct or 
linear. Sexual imagery is not so simple to assess. In the sexual 
realm, perhaps more so than in any other, messages and their 
impact on the viewer or reader are often multiple, contradictory, 
layered and highly contextual. 
The film Swept Away illustrates that serious problems of con-
text and interpretation confound even the categories which on 
first reading might seem reasonably easy to apply. Made in 1975 
by Italian director Lina Wertmuller, Swept Away tells a power-
ful story of dominance and submission. A rich attractive woman 
and a younger working class man are first shown as class antago-
nists during a yachting trip on which the man is a deckhand and 
the woman a viciously rude boss, and then as sexual antagonists 
when they are stranded on a Mediterranean island and the man 
exacts his revenge. During the second part of the film, the man 
rapes the woman and repeatedly assaults her. She initially re-
sists, then falls in love with him, and he with her. 
Scenes in Swept Away clearly present the woman character as 
"experienc[ing] sexual pleasure" during rape. In addition, she is 
humiliated, graphically and sexually, and appears to grow to en-
joy it. Although sexually explicit depictions are not the majority 
of scenes, the film as a whole has an active sexual dynamic. 
Given the overall and pervasive theme of sexual dominance and 
submission, it is improbable that the explicit scenes could be 
7 
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deemed "isolated." It is virtually certain that the film could be 
suppressed under the ordinance since it was shown in laboratory 
studies cited by Appellants to measure negative impact of ag-
gressive erotic materials.' 
Swept Away is an example of graphic, sexually explicit images 
and characterizations used to treat themes of power imbalance, 
to push at the edges of what is thought to be acceptable or desir-
able, and to shock. Critical and popular opinions of the film va-
ried, ranging from admiration to repulsion:~ Whatever one's in-
terpretation of the film, however, its profoundly important 
themes entitle it to a place in the realm of public discourse. 
Context often determines meaning. Whether a specific image 
could be found to "subordinate" or "degrade" women may de-
pend entirely on such factors as the purpose of the presentation; 
the size and nature of the audience; the surrounding messages; 
the expectation and attitude of the viewer; and where the pres-
entation takes place, among others. 8 Yet the trafficking provision 
allows blanket suppression of images based on highly subjective 
criteria which masquerade as simple, delineating definitions. 
4. See Appellants' Exh. S. at 114-15. 
5. The reviewer for Ms. Magazine wrote: 
At several points I was very offended by the idea of love won by brute 
force. . . . I'd like to explain this away by stressing that this is an allegory of 
class war, not sex war. But that is not true. For the brilliance of "Swept Away" 
is that it is everything at once. As a description of what capitalism does to us it 
is sophisticated and deep. At the same time, it comes to grips with the "war" 
between the sexes better than anything I've seen or read. . . . It has shocking 
scenes linking sex and violence and yet it is about tenderness .... [It] is a 
funny, beautiful, emotional movie about a somber, ugly, intellectual subject. 
Garson, A Reviewer Under the Influence, Ms. Magazine, Dec. 1975, at 37, 38. 
Other reviewers strongly disagreed: 
I really don't know what is more distasteful about this film-its slavish adher-
ence to the barroom credo that all women really want is to be beaten, to be 
shown who's boss, or the readiness with which it has been accepted by the crit-
ics. Yes, it is effective enough in parts, but strictly on the level of slick 
pornography. 
Turan, Not Swept Away, The Progressive, May 1976, at 39, 40. 
6. The same theme may be perceived very differently in different contexts. In her 
novel, A Sea Change, feminist author Lois Gould repeatedly invokes fantasies and 
images of rape and submission in order to make more dramatic her story of women 
transforming their sexual lives. One striking passage narrates the main female character 
being stroked and then entered by the gun held by a fantasy male character, B.G. 
L. Gould, A Sea Change 95 (1977). At the end of the novel, the woman character be-
comes B.G. This graphic depiction of penetration by an object, undoubtedly suppressible 
under the ordinance, especially since there are several scenes in· the book which could 
meet the definition of pornography, is one of the fantasies Gould explores and uses in 
her treatment of the theme of sexual power. 
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C. The Ordinance Is Unconstitutionally Vague Because Its 
Central Terms Have No Fixed Meaning, and the Most Com-
mon Meanings of These Terms Are Sexist and Damaging to 
Women. 
The ordinance's definition of pornography, essential to each 
cause of action, is fatally flawed. It relies on words often defined 
in ways that reinforce a constricted and constricting view of 
women's sexuality. Thus Amici fear that experimentations in 
feminist art which deal openly and explicitly with sexual themes 
will be easily targeted for suppression under this ordinance. 
The central term "sexually explicit subordination" is not de-
fined. 7 Appellants argue that "subordination" means that which 
"places women in positions of inferiority, loss of power, degrada-
tion and submission, among other things." Appellants' brief at 
26. The core question, however, is left begging: what kinds of 
sexually explicit acts place a woman in an inferior status? Ap-
pellants argued in their brief to the District Court that "[t]he 
mere existence of pornography in society degrades and demeans 
all women." Defendants' memorandum at 10. To some observ-
ers, any graphic image of sexual acts is "degrading" to women 
and hence would subordinate them. To some, the required ele-
ment of subordination or "positions of . . . submission" might 
be satisfied by the image of a woman lying on her back inviting 
intercourse, while others might view the same image as affirming 
women's sexual pleasure and initiative. Some might draw the 
line at acts outside the bounds of marriage or with multiple 
partners. Others might see a simple image of the most tradi-
tional heterosexual act as subordinating in presenting the man 
in a physical position of superiority and the woman in a position 
of inferiority. 
In any of these contexts, it is not clear whether the ordinance 
is to be interpreted with a subjective or an objective standard. If 
a subjective interpretation of "subordination" is contemplated, 
the ordinance vests in individual women a power to impose their 
views of politically or morally correct sexuality upon other 
women by calling for repression of images consistent with those 
7. To define "pornography" as that which subordinates women, and then prohibit as 
pornographic that which subordinates, makes the claim that pornography subordinates 
either circular or logically trivial. 
9 
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views. The evaluative· terms-subordination, degradation, abase-
ment-are initially within the definitional control of the plain-
tiff, whose interpretation, if colorable, must be accepted by the 
court. An objective standard would require a court to determine 
whether plaintiff's reaction to the material comports with some 
generalized notion of which images do or do not degrade women. 
It would require the judiciary to impose its views of correct sex-
uality on a diverse community. The inevitable result would be to 
disapprove those images that are least conventional and privi-
lege those that are closest to majoritarian beliefs about proper 
sexuality. 
Whether subjective or objective, the inquiry is one that plainly 
and profoundly threatens First Amendment freedoms and is to-
tally inconsistent with feminist principles, as they are under-
stood by Amici. Sexuality is particularly susceptible to ex-
tr~mely charged emotions, including feelings of vulnerability and 
power. The realm of image judgment opened by the ordinance is 
too contested and sensitive to be entrusted to legislative catego-
rization and judicial enforcement. 
The danger of discrimination is illustrated by the probability 
that some women would consider any explicit lesbian scene as 
subordinating, or as causing "[their] dignity [to] suffer," Appel-
lants' brief at 36. Appellants plainly intend to include same-sex 
depictions, since their carefully selected trial court exhibits in-
clude such materials.8 Lesbians and gay men9 encounter massive 
discrimination based on prejudice related to their sexuality.10 
The trafficking provision of the ordinance virtually invites new 
manifestations of this prejudice by means of civil litigation 
against the erotica of sexual minorities. 
8. See, e.g., Appellants' Exhs. N., M., and W. These exhibits, like most commercial 
pornography which depicts sex between women, were not produced by or primarily for 
lesbians. Yet part of the shock value of such images in contemporary society may be 
attributable to their depiction of sexual explicitness between women. When the door is 
opened to suppress "scenarios of degradation," for example, there is no guarantee that 
this shock value of any graphic depiction of homosexual acts will not spill over to images 
and texts which authentically express lesbian sexuality. 
9. The provision that "the use of men ... in the place of women . . . shall also 
constitute pornography" makes clear that same-sex male images and texts could fall 
within the scope of the ordinance, especially so, one supposes, if one male partner is 
depicted as effeminate. 
10. See, e.g., Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982), on appeal; People v. 
Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1980); National Gay Task 
Forcev. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd per curiam, 53 U.S.L.W. 
4408 (U.S. Mar. 26, 1985). 
10 
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The six subsections of the definition applicable to a trafficking 
complaint provide no clarification. The term "sexual object," for 
example, appears frequently in the definition. Appellants are 
confident that "the common man knows a sex object when he 
sees one." Appellants' brief at 40. Yet, although "sex object" 
may be a phrase which has begun to enjoy widened popular us-
age, its precise meaning is far from clear. Some persons maintain 
that any detachment of women's sexuality from procreation, 
marriage, and family objectifies it, removing it from its "natu-
ral" web of association and context. When sex is detached from 
its traditional moorings, men allegedly benefit and women are 
the victims.11 Feminists, on the other hand, generally use the 
term "sex object" to mean the absence of any indicia of per-
sonhood, a very different interpretation. 
Appellants argue that the meaning of "subordination" and 
"degradation" can be determined in relation to "common usage 
and understanding." Appellants' brief at 33. But as we have 
seen, the common understanding of sexuality is one that incor-
porates a sexual double standard. Historically, virtually all sexu-
ally explicit literature and imagery has been thought to be de-
grading or abasing or humiliating, especially to women. 
The interpretation of such morally charged terms has varied 
notoriously over time and place. A state supreme court thirty 
years ago ruled that the words "obscene, lewd, licentious, inde-
cent, lascivious, immoral, [and] scandalous" were "neither vague 
nor indefinite" and had "a meaning understood by all." State v. 
Becker, 364 Mo. 1079, 1087, 272 S.E.2d 283, 288 (1954). See also 
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 518 (1948). In Kansasv. 
Great American Theatre Co., the court accepted as a definition 
for "prurient interest," "an unhealthy, unwholesome, morbid, 
degrading, and shameful interest in sex," 227 Kan. 633, 633, 608 
P.2d 951, 952 (1980) (emphasis added). A Florida obscenity stat-
ute which declared it to be "unlawful to publish, sell[, etc.] any 
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent, immoral, degrading, 
sadistic, masochistic or disgusting bookm2 was found to be no 
longer adequate after the decision in Roth v. United States, 354 
U.S. 476 (1957), absent both a contemporary definition of those 
terms and a standard based on the materials' overall value and 
11. See, e.g., G. Gilder, Sexual Suicide (1973). 
12. Act of June 20, 1957 ch. 57-779, § 1, 1957 Fla. Laws vol. 1, pt. 1, 1102, 1103-04 
(amending Fla. Stat. § 847.01) (amended 1959, repealed 1961) (emphasis added). 
11 
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not just their explicitness.18 After Roth and subsequent deci-
sions, the statute was amended three times to incorporate these 
additional elements. 14 Upon amending the statute in 1961, the 
word "degrading" was dropped. Words like "degradation," 
"abasement," and "humiliation" have been used in the past syn-
onymously with subjective, moralistic terms. There is no reason 
to believe that the language in this ordinance will be magically 
resistant to that kind of interpretation. 
The First Amendment prohibits any law regulating expression 
which would of necessity result in such unpredictable and arbi-
trary interpretations. This ordinance transgresses all three of the 
measures of impermissible vagueness. A person of ordinary intel-
ligence would be at a loss to predict how any of a huge range of 
sexually explicit materials would be interpreted by a court. 
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); Smith v. 
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 
U.S. 352, 357 (1983). Protected expression would be chilled be-
cause the makers, distributors, and exhibitors of sexually ex-
plicit works would be induced to practice self-censorship rather 
than risk potentially endless lawsuits under this ordinance. 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 41 (1976); Smith v. Goguen, 415 
U.S. at 573. Lastly, the absence of reasonably clear guidelines 
for triers of fact would open the door to arbitrary and discrimi-
natory enforcement of the ordinance. Id.; Grayned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U.S. at 108; Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. at 358; 
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1972). 
The ordinance requires enforcement of "common understand-
ings" of culturally loaded terms. It perpetuates beliefs which un-
dermine the principle that women are full, equal, and active 
agents in every realm of life, including the sexual. 
13. See State v. Cohen, 125 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1960); State v. Reese, 222 So. 2d 732 
(Fla. 1969); and Rhodes v. State, 283 So. 2d 351 (Fia. 1973). 
14. See Act of May 5, 1961, ch. 61-7, 1961 Fla. Laws vol. 1, pt. 1, 13; Act of June 3, 
1969, ch.69-41, 1969 Fla. Laws vol. 1, pt.I, 164; Act of June 7, 1973, ch. 73-120, 1973 Fla. 
Laws 185. • 
12 
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D. Sexually Explicit Speech Does Not Cause or Incite Violence 
in a Manner Sufficiently Direct to Justify Its Suppression 
Under the First Amendment. 
To uphold this ordinance and the potential suppression of all 
speech which could be found to fall within its definition of por-
nography, this court must invent a new exception to the First 
Amendment. To justify that, Appellants must show that the 
speech to be suppressed will lead to immediate and concrete 
harm. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Collin v. 
Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 
(1978). Only a small number of social science studies which pur-
port to show a connection between violent pornography and neg-
ative attitudes and behavior toward women have been offered to 
support this position. For many reasons, their effort must fail. 
Substantively, the studies relied upon do not justify the 
sweeping suppression authorized by the ordinance. Appellants 
cite the social science data in highly selective and grossly dis-
torting ways. They fail to acknowledge that most of it is limited 
to studies of a narrow class of violent imagery. The ordinance, 
by contrast, both leaves untouched most of the images which 
may be said to cause negative effects and would allow the sup-
pression of many images which have not been shown to have any 
harmful effect. Appellants also fail to mention that the "de-
briefing" phase of the cited experiments suggests that negative 
changes in attitudes may be corrected through further speech. 
They seek to create the false impression that new social science 
data have completely refuted the finding in 1971 by the Presi-
dential Commission on Obscenity and Pornography that pornog-
raphy was not harmful. However, as Professor Edward Donner-
stein wrote in the study placed before the District Court by 
Appellants as Exh. T. at 127-28, 
One should not assume . . . that all the research since 
the commission's time has indicated negative effects [ of 
pornographic materials] on individuals. In fact, this is 
quite to the contrary .... (A] good amount of research 
strongly supports the position that exposure to certain 
types of erotica can reduce aggressive responses in people 
who are predisposed to aggression. The reader should 
13 
FALL 1987-WINTER 1988] FACT Brief 
keep in mind the fact that erotica has been shown to 
have many types of effects. 
113 
Lastly, whatever Appellants' claims, numerous methodological 
problems make these studies too unreliable as predictors of real 
world behavior to sustain the withdrawal of constitutional pro-
tection from what is now permitted speech. 
Although the ordinance authorizes suppression of far more 
than simply violent images, the limited findings of a linkage be-
tween sexually explicit materials and a willingness to aggress 
against women under laboratory conditions have occurred only 
in studies of "aggressive pornography," defined as a particular 
scenario: "depictions in which physical force is used or 
threatened to coerce a woman to engage in sexual acts (e.g. 
rape)." Appellants' Exh. S. at 105. This limiting definition is 
used by both Professor Donnerstein and Professor Neil 
Malamuth in the recently published book, Pornography and 
Sexual Aggression. See Malamuth, Aggression Against Women: 
Cultural and Individual Causes, in Pornography and Sexual Ag-
gression 19, 29-30 (N. Malamuth & E. Donnerstein eds. 1984); 
Donnerstein, Pornography: Its Effect on Violence Against 
Women, in Pornography and Sexual Aggression, supra, at 53, 63. 
Where nonaggressive pornography is studied, no effect on ag-
gression against women has been found; it is the violent, and not 
the sexual, content of the depiction that is said to produce the 
effects. 111 Further, all of the aggression studies have used visual 
imagery; none has studied the impact of only words. Finally, 
even as to violent "aggressive pornography," the results of the 
studies are not uniform. 16 
15. 
Studies have indicated that if you take out the explicit sexual content from 
aggressive pornographic films, leaving just the violence (which could be shown 
on any network television show), you find desensitization to violent acts in some 
subjects. However, if you take out the aggressive component and leave just the 
sexual, you do not seem to observe negative effects of desensitization to violence 
against women. Thus, violence is at issue here. That is why restrictions or cen-
sorship solutions are problematical. 
Donnerstein & Linz, Debate on Pornography, Film Comment, Dec. 1984, at 34, 35. 
16. Malamuth describes a study he did in which no evidence was found of changes in 
perceptions or attitudes following exposure to this type of pornography: 
One group of male and female subjects looked at issues of Penthouse and Play-
boy magazines that showed incidents of sadomasochism and rape. A second 
group examined issues of these magazines that contained only non-aggressive 
pornography and a third group was given only neutral materials. Shortly after-
ward, subjects watched an actual videotaped interview with a rape victim and 
14 
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Violent and misogynist images are pervasive in our culture. 
Nothing in the research cited by Appellants proves their hy-
pothesis that these messages are believed in a qualitatively dif-
ferent way when they are communicated through the medium of 
sexually explicit material. Both Professors Donnerstein and 
Malamuth have noted that regulation of imagery targeted at the 
sexually explicit misses the core of the problem: 
Images of violence against women are not the sole prop-
erty of aggressive or violent pornography. Such images 
are quite pervasive in our society. Images outside of the 
pornographic or X-rated market may in fact be of more 
concern, since they are imbued with a certain "legiti-
macy" surrounding them and tend to have much wider 
acceptance. 
Sexist attitudes, callous attitudes about rape, and 
other misogynist values are just as likely to be reinforced 
by non-sexualized violent symbols as they are by violent 
pornography. 
Donnerstein & Linz, supra p. 14, at 35 (emphasis added). 
Attempts to alter the content of mass media ... cannot 
be limited to pornography, since research has docu-
mented similar effects from mainstream movies. In addi-
tion, other mass media forms, such as advertisements, 
television soap operas, and detective magazines, to name 
a few, also contain undesirable images of violence against 
women. The most pertinent question on the issue of 
changing mass media content may not be where we draw 
the line between pornography and non-pornography but 
how we can best combat violence against women in its 
myriad forms. 
Malamuth & Lindstrom, Debate on Pornography, Film Com-
ment, Dec. 1984, at 39, 40. 
responded to a questionnaire assessing their perceptions of a rape victim and her 
experience. Weeks later ... subjects indicated their views on rape in response 
to a newspaper article. Exposure to the aggressive pornography did not affect 
perceptions of rape either in response to the videotaped interview with a rape 
victim or to the newspaper article. 
Appellants' Exh. S. at 113. 
15 
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When "more speech" can be an effective means of countering 
prejudicial and discriminatory messages, the First Amendment 
forbids the use of censorship to suppress even the most hateful 
content. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 916 (1978). The social science data upon which Appel-
lants rely so heavily indicate that further speech can remove the 
negative effects on attitude registered after viewing certain kinds 
of violent pornography. Malamuth and Donnerstein both con-
duct "debriefing" sessions at the conclusion of their experi-
ments. In these sessions, the purposes of the studies are ex-
plained to the subjects, and information is presented to dispel 
rape myths. The effectiveness of the debriefing sessions is then 
tested up to four months later. "The findings of these studies 
indicated consistently that the education interventions were suc-
cessful in counteracting the effects. of aggressive pornography 
and in reducing beliefs in rape myths." Malamuth, supra p. 14, 
at 46. 
Censorship is not the solution. Education, however, is a 
viable alternative. Early sex education programs which 
dispel myths about sexual violence and early training in 
critical viewing skills could mitigate the influence of 
these films. 
Donnerstein & Linz, supra p. 14, at 35. 
This debriefing effect demonstrates that the changes in attitude 
shown from pornography are not permanent or, as Appellants 
contend, conditioned. 
The substance of the social science data provides no support 
for the broad suppression of speech authorized by the ordinance. 
Further, even if the ordinance were narrowly limited to the "ag-
gressive pornography" which has been studied, limits in the 
methodology fatally undermine Appellants' claims that even this 
violent material causes the sort of concrete, immediate harm 
that could justify creating a new exception to the First 
Amendment. 
Behavior under laboratory conditions cannot predict behavior 
in life with the degree of accuracy and specificity required to 
justify a censorship law. The college students being studied in 
these laboratory tests knew that their actions would have no ac-
tual negative impact on real people. Indeed, the experimental 
16 
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setting may induce conduct in subjects that they would not oth-
erwise exhibit. In the words of one theorist: 
Laboratory studies that deliberately lower restraints 
against aggression . . . may be seen as representing a re-
versal of the normal socialization process. After a subject 
has been angered, he is allowed (actually told) to attack 
his adversary. The victim emits no pain cues ... and the 
subject not only feels better but learns that, in this labo-
ratory situation, aggression is permissible and socially ap-
proved (i.e. condoned by the experimenter). 
Donnerstein, supra p. 14, at 60. 
Moreover, most of the reported willingness to aggress occurs 
only in subjects who are previously angered as part of the exper-
iment shortly before they are asked to administer shocks. See 
generally Donnerstein, supra p. 14. Some researchers believe 
that the anger is the primary factor producing the manifestation 
of aggression. See Gray, Exposure to Pornography and Aggres-
sion Toward Women: The Case of the Angry Male, 29 Soc. 
Probs. 387 (1982). 
Additionally, in most studies cited, aggressive behavior occurs 
only when the experimenter gives subjects disinhibitory cues in-
dicating that such behavior is acceptable, and not when the ex-
perimenter provides an inhibitory communication. 
These data highlight the important role of situational 
factors in affecting aggression against women and suggest 
that, while cultural factors such as aggressive pornogra-
phy may increase some males' aggressive tendencies, the 
actual expression of aggressive responses may be strongly 
regulated by varied internal and external (i.e., situa-
tional) variables. 
Malamuth, supra p. 14, at 35. 
In life, more than in a laboratory, a multitude of interacting 
factors shape behavior, including early childhood experiences, 
family dynamics, religious training, formal education, and one's 
perceived relation to governmental structures and the legal sys-
tem, as well as the entire range of media stimuli.17 It is difficult 
17. See also Abramson & Hayashi, Pornography in Japan: Cross-Cultural and Theo-
retical Considerations, in Pornography and Sexual Aggression 173 (N. Malamuth & E. 
17 
FALL 1987-WINTER 1988] FACT Brief 117 
even in the laboratory to identify a single "cause" for behavior.18 
Every study finding a negative effect under laboratory condi-
tions from viewing an image cannot be grounds for rewriting the 
First Amendment. 
Appellants and supporting amici also claim a causal connec-
tion between the availability of pornography and rape. Such a 
claim is implausible on its face. Acts of rape and coercion long 
preceded the mass distribution of pornography, and in many 
cultures pornography is unavailable, yet the incidence of rape, 
Donnerstein eds. 1984). Japanese pornography contains more depictions of rape and 
bondage than does American pornography and is also more readily available in popular 
magazines and on television. Yet, Japan has a substantially lower incidence of rape than 
any western country and a lower incidence of violent crime generally. The authors attri-
bute the lower crime rate to cultural factors unrelated to pornography. 
18. A good example of the limitations of laboratory studies is provided by the study 
described in Appellants' Exh. R. Male subjects viewed violent "slasher" movies, one a 
day for five consecutive days, and answered questions each day about the extent to 
which the film was degrading to women. The subjects clearly knew that attitudes related 
to sexual violence against women were being measured. On the last day of the experi-
ment, subjects were informed that the sixth and final film had not arrived. They were 
told since their original film did not arrive they would watch a law school documentary 
about a rape trial. After viewing the rape documentary, subjects completed question-
naires. The authors concluded that "exposed subjects later judged the victim of a violent 
assault and rape to be significantly less injured and generally more worthless than a 
control group of subjects who saw no films." Appellants' Exh. R., abstract. 
Appellants cite this study in support of their claim that "pornography" makes men 
"less able to perceive that an account of rape is an account of rape." Appellants' brief at 
20. The study is of limited value. First, the images used in the slasher films are not 
within the ordinance's definition of pornography. Second, there is a high probability that 
"demand characteristics"-where subjects understand the purpose of a study and give 
the experimenter what he or she is thought to be looking for-skewed the responses. 
Third, the term "worthless" did not occur spontaneously to the subjects, but was sug-
gested by a question asking, "I felt [the victim) was: valuable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 worthless." 
Thus, when the authors state that subjects who viewed the films found the victim "more 
worthless," they mean that the subjects circled the number 6, say, instead of the number 
4. The question regarding the perception of the victim's injury was presented in a similar 
manner. What is being measured in studies of this type are not complex sets of attitudes, 
such as all of us have in real life, but gross responses on a questionnaire. Fourth, al-
though the authors found "significant differences" between subjects who had viewed the 
films and those who had not on the "injury" and "worthlessness" measures, they did not 
find significant differences on other measures including defendant intention, victim resis-
tance, victim responsibility, victim sympathy, and victim unattractiveness. Finally, an 
hypothesized correlation between perception of violence and perception of degradation 
proved to be non-significant, as did the expected correlation between perception of deg-
radation and enjoyment of the film. The point is not that this is poor social science 
research, but that this kind of research does not produce evidence sufficiently strong to 
justify censorship. 
18 
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and of discrimination against women generally, is high.19 The 
converse is also true; that is, there are places where pornography 
is widely available, and the incidence of rape is low compared to 
the United States. 
Many studies have focused on Denmark to discern whether 
their abolition of the laws restricting pornography in the mid-
1960's could be linked to any changes in behavior. Numerous 
conflicting arguments have been made as to the implications of 
the Danish experience. In 1979, the British Committee on Ob-
scenity and Film Censorship published a report critically review-
ing extensive data on the asserted linkage between pornography 
and sexual violence. Because it was done a decade after the 
American report, it includes much of the recent work published 
on this topic. The Committee found "no support at all" for the 
thesis that the availability of pornography in Denmark could be 
linked to an increase in sexual offenses. "It is impossible to dis-
cern a significant trend in rape which could be linked in any way 
to the free availability of pornography since the late 1960s." Ob-
scenity and Film Censorship 83 (B. Williams ed. 1979). -
Appellants' argument that pornography should be precluded 
from First Amendment protection would require this Court to 
find that it causes harm in the direct, immediate way that 
falsely shouting fire in a crowded theater does. The social sci-
ence data upon which they rely lend no support to such a claim. 
The findings relate to only a small portion of the material which 
the ordinance would suppress, results of the studies are mixed, 
and even the data which report laboratory findings of aggression 
cannot be used blithely to predict behavior in the real world. 
E. Constitutional Protection for Sexually Explicit Speech 
Should Be Enhanced, Not Diminished. 
Sexually explicit speech which is judged "obscene" is not pro-
tected under the First Amendment. Miller v. California, 413 
19. Even the Baron and Strauss chapter, Sexual Stratification, Pornography, and 
Rape in the United States, in Pornography and Sexual Aggression, cited by the W.A.P. 
amicus brief at 16, which found, in a state-by-state analysis, a positive correlation be-
tween circulation rates for mainstream pornographic magazines (e.g., Playboy) and inci-
dents of rape, could not explain some strikingly anomalous results, such as, for example, 
Utah, which ranked 51st (last) in per capita readership of sex magazines, but 25th in per 
capita rate of rape. 
19 
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U.S. 15 (1973). Appellants seek to vitiate the protection cur-
rently afforded non-obscene sexual speech on the ground that 
any expression falling within the scope of this ordinance "is not 
the free exchange of ideas." Appellants' brief at 12. They ask 
this Court to rule that all sexually explicit speech is disfavored: 
It is essential to look at the nature of the material reg-
ulated to measure the importance of the chilling ef-
fect .... [T]he ordinance reaches 'sexually explicit ac-
tivity.' . . . The Supreme Court has determined that 
"there is ... a less vital interest in the uninhibited exhi-
bition of material that is on the borderline between por-
nography and artistic· expression than in the free dissemi-
nation of ideas of social and political significance." The 
message of Young is that it is constitutional for anyone 
who steps too close to the line to take the risk of crossing 
it when sexually explicit material is involved. The chill-
ing effect is simply not entitled to great weight in this 
context. 
Appellants' brief at 53 (citations omitted). 
The argument that the First Amendment provides less protec-
tion for sexual images than for speech which is "political" mis-
understands both the value of free expression and the political 
content of sexually explicit speech. Many justifications support 
free expression: our incapacity to determine truth without open 
discussion; the need for people to communicate to express self 
identity and determine how to live their lives; the inability of 
the censor to wield power wisely. 
Further, sexual speech is political. One core insight of modern 
feminism is that the personal is political. The question of who 
does the dishes and rocks the cradle affects both the nature of 
the home and the composition of the legislature. The dynamics 
of intimate relations are likewise political, both to the individ-
uals involved and by their multiplied effects to the wider soci-
ety. 20 To argue, as Appellants do, that sexually explicit speech is 
less important than other categories of discourse reinforces the 
conceptual structures that have identified women's concerns 
20. Even clearly misogynist pornography is political speech. Indeed, antipornography 
activists have often argued that pornography is political propaganda for male dominance. 
One lawyer then associated with Women Against Pornography pointed out that the po-
litical message of pornography hostile to women results in its entitlement to heightened, 
20 
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with relationships and intimacy as less significant and valuable 
precisely because those concerns are falsely regarded as having 
no bearing on the structure of social and political life. 
Depictions of ways of living and acting that are radically dif-
ferent from our own can enlarge the range of human possibilities 
open to us and help us grasp the potentialities of human behav-
ior, both good and bad. Rich fantasy imagery allows us to expe-
rience in imagination ways of being that we may not wish to ex-
perience in real life. Such an enlarged vision of possible realities 
enhances our human potential and is highly relevant to our deci-
sion-making as citizens on a wide range of social and ethical 
issues. 
For sexual minorities, speech describing conduct can be a 
means of self-affirmation in a generally hostile world. Constric-
tions on that speech can deny fundamental aspects of self-iden-
tity. Cf. Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 24 Cal. 
3d 458, 488, 594 P.2d 592, 611, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 33 (1979). In 
Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, 730 F.2d 444 (6th 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3614 (U.S. Feb. 26, 1985), a 
public employee was fired from her job because she confided .in 
coworkers that she was bisexual. Although her statement re-
sulted in no disruption of the workplace, the Court of Appeals 
ruled that it was constitutionally permissible to fire her "for 
talking about it." Id. at 450. Yet, as in Gay Law Students Asso-
ciation, the speech should have been considered political: 
I think it is impossible not to note that a . . . public de-
bate is currently ongoing regarding the rights of homo-
sexuals. The fact of petitioner's bisexuality, once spoken, 
necessarily and ineluctably involved her in that debate. 
Speech that "touches upon" this explosive issue is no less 
deserving of constitutional attention than speech relating 
to more widely condemned -forms of discrimination. 
Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 53 U.S.L.W. at 3615 
(Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari). 
not lesser, First Amendment protection as a form of advocacy, albeit of noxious ideas. 
Kaminer, Pornography and the First Amendment: Prior Restraints and Private Action, 
in Take Back the Night: Women and Pornography 239-46 (1980). 
21 
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Thus, sexually explicit expression, including much that is cov-
ered by the ordinance, carries many more messages than simply 
the misogyny described by Appellants. It may convey the mes-
sage that sexuality need not be tied to reproduction, men, or do-
mesticity. It may contain themes of sex for no reason other than 
pleasure, sex without commitment, and sexual adventure-all of 
which are surely ideas. Cf. Kingsley Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 
684 (1959). 
Even pornography which is problematic for women can be ex-
perienced as affirming of women's desires and of women's 
equality: 
Pornography can be a psychic assault, both in its content 
and in its public intrusions on our attention, but for 
women as for men it can also be a source of erotic pleas-
ure. A woman who is raped is a victim; a woman who en-
joys pornography (even if that means enjoying a rape 
fantasy) is in a sense a rebel, insisting on an aspect of her 
sexuality that has been defined as a male preserve. Inso-
far as pornography glorifies male supremacy and sexual 
alienation, it is deeply reactionary. But in rejecting sex-
ual repression and hypocrisy-which have inflicted even 
more damage on women than on men-it expresses a 
radical impulse. 
Willis, Feminism, Moralism and Pornography, in Powers of De-
sire: The Politics of Sexuality 460, 464 (A. Snitow, C. Stansell & 
S. Thompson eds. 1983). Fantasy is not the same as wish fulfill-
ment. See N. Friday, My Secret Garden: Women's Secret Fanta-
sies (1973) and Forbidden Flowers: More Women's Sexual Fan-
tasies (1975). But one cannot fully discuss or analyze fantasy if 
the use of explicit language is precluded. 
The range of feminist imagination and expression in the realm 
of sexuality has barely begun to find voice. Women need the 
freedom and the socially recognized space to appropriate for 
themselves the robustness of what traditionally has been male 
language. Laws such as the one under challenge here would con-
strict that freedom. See Blakely, Is One Woman's Sexuality An-
other Woman's Pornography?, Ms. Magazine, Apr. 1985, at 37. 
Amici fear that as more women's writing and art on sexual 
22 
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themes21 emerge which are unladylike, unfeminine, aggressive, 
power-charged, pushy, vulgar, urgent, confident, and intense, the 
traditional foes of women's attempts to step out of their "proper 
place" will find an effective tool of repression in the Indianapolis 
ordinance. 
II. THE ORDINANCE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DISCRIMINATES ON 
THE BASIS OF SEX AND REINFORCES SEXIST STEREOTYPES. 
The challenged ordinance posits a great chasm-a categorical 
difference-between the make-up and needs of men and of 
women. It goes far beyond acknowledgment of the differences in 
life experiences which are inevitably produced by social struc-
tures of gender inequality. The ordinance presumes women as a 
class (and only women) are subordinated by virtually any sexu-
ally explicit image. It presumes women as a class (and only 
women) are incapable of making a binding agreement to partici-
pate in the creation of sexually explicit material. And it 
presumes men as a class (and only men) are conditioned by sex-
ually explicit depictions to commit acts of aggression and to be-
lieve misogynist myths. 
Such assumptions reinforce and perpetuate central sexist ste-
reotypes; they weaken, rather than enhance, women's struggles 
to free themselves of archaic notions of gender roles. In so doing, 
this ordinance itself violates the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In treating women as a special class, it 
repeats the error of earlier protectionist legislation which gave 
women no significant benefits and denied their equality. 
21. The following are among the works which could fall within the scope of the ordi-
nance's definition and thus be suppressed pursuant to the trafficking cause of action: K. 
Acker, Blood and Guts in High School (1984); Bad Attitude (Quarterly, Boston); L. 
Barbach, Pleasures: Women Write Erotica (1984); A Woman's Touch (Cedar & Nelly 
eds. 1979); J. Chicago, The Dinner Party (1979); T. Corinne & J. Lapidus, Yantras of 
Women Love (1982); N. Friday, My Secret Garden: Women's Sexual Fantasies (1973) 
and Forbidden Flowers: More Women's Sexual Fantasies (1975); L. Gould, A Sea Change 
(1977); E. Jong, Fear of Flying (1973) and How to Save Your Own Life (1976); Kensing-
ton Ladies Erotica Society, Ladies Home Erotica (1984); S. Kitzinger, Women's Experi-
ence of Sex (1983); R. Mapplethorpe, Lady Lisa Lyon (1983); K. Millett, Sita (1976); A. 
Nin, Delta of Venus (1977); Olds, Bestiary, in Powers of Desire: The Politicsof Sexuality 
supra p. 22, at 409; A. Oakgrove~aging Peace (1984); J. Rechy, City of Night 
(1963); Coming to Power (Samois ed. 1982); Shulman, A Story of a Girl and Her Dog, in 
Powers of Desire: The Politics of Sexuality, supra, p. 22 at 410. 
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A. The District Court Erred in Accepting Appellants' Assertion 
That Pornography Is a Discriminatory Practice Based on 
Sex. 
The ordinance is predicated on a finding that: 
Pornography is a discriminatory practice based on sex 
which denies women equal opportunities in society. Por-
nography is central in creating and maintaining sex as a 
basis for discrimination .... [It harms] women's oppor-
tunities for equality of rights in employment, education, 
access to and use of public accommodations, and acquisi-
tion of real property; promote[s] rape, battery, child 
abuse, kidnapping and prostitution and inhibit[s] just 
enforcement of laws against such acts . 
Indianapolis, Ind., Code § 16-l(a)(2). 
The District Court accepted that finding, but held that First 
Amendment values outweighed the asserted interest in protect-
ing women. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 
1316, 1335-37 (S.D. Ind. 1984). 
Amici dispute the City and County's "finding" that "pornog-
raphy is central in creating and maintaining sex as a basis for 
discrimination." There was no formal, or indeed informal, legis-
lative fact-finding process leading to this conclusion. Rather, leg-
islators who had previously opposed obscenity on more tradi-
tional and moralistic grounds adopted a "model bill" 
incorporating this finding.22 The model bill was in turn based on 
legislative hearings, held in Minneapolis, which did not, in fair-
ness, reflect a reasoned attempt to understand the factors "cen-
tral" in maintaining "sex as a basis for discrimination. "23 See 
Appellants' brief at 15 n.6. -
It is true that sex discrimination takes multiple forms, which 
are reflected in the media. But the finding that "pornography is 
central in creating and maintaining sex as a basis for discrimina-
22. Duggan, Censorship in the Name of Feminism, Village Voice, Oct. 16, 1984, at 15, 
col. 1. 
23. Courts may not defer to legislative determination of fact when the supposed 
"facts" are marshaled to suppress free speech or to justify sex discrimination. "Deference 
to a legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are at 
stake," Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978). See also 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
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tion" does not represent our best understanding of the complex, 
deep-seated and structural causes of gender inequality. In the 
past decade, many people have grappled with the question of 
causation. Feminist law professors and scholars have published 
and revised collections of cases and materials. K. Davidson, R. 
Ginsberg & H. Kay, supra p. 3 (1974 & 2d ed. 1981); B. Babcock, 
A. Freedman, E. Norton & S. Ross, Sex Discrimination and the 
Law: Causes and Remedies (1974 & Supp. 1978). The factors 
they find most significant include: the sex segregated wage labor 
market; systematic devaluation of work traditionally done by 
women; sexist concepts of marriage and family; inadequate in-
come maintenance programs for women unable to find wage 
work; lack of day care services and the premise that child care is 
an exclusively female responsibility; barriers to reproductive 
freedom; and discrimination and segregation in education and 
athletics.24 Numerous feminist scholars have written major 
works tracing the cultural, economic, and psychosocial roots of 
women's oppression. 211 
Misogynist images, both those which are sexually explicit and 
the far more pervasive ones which are not, reflect and may help 
to reinforce the inferior social and economic status of women. 
But none of these studies and analyses identifies sexually ex-
plicit material as the central factor in the oppression of women. 
History teaches us that the answer is not so simple. Factors far 
more complex than pornography produced the English common 
law treatment of women as chattel property and the enactment 
of statutes allowing a husband to rape or beat his wife with im-
punity. In short, the claim that "pornography is central in creat-
ing and maintaining sex as a basis of discrimination" is flatly 
inconsistent with the conclusions of most who have studied the 
question. 
Amici also dispute the "finding" that pornography, as defined 
by the ordinance, is "a discriminatory practice ... which denies 
24. See also U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Women and Poverty (1974); Women 
Still in Poverty (1979); and Child Care and Equal Opportunity for Women (1981) and 
National Advisory Council on Economic Opportunity, Final Report: The American 
Promise: Equal Justice and Economic Opportunity (1981). 
25. See, e.g., Toward an Anthropology of Women (R. Reiter ed. 1975); M. Rosaldo & 
L. Lamphere, Women, Culture and Society (1974); M. Ryan, Womanhood in America: 
From Colonial Times to the Present (1979); N. Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mother-
ing: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (1978); D. Dinnerstein, The Mermaid 
and the Minotaur: Sexual Arrangements and Human Malaise (1976); J. Mitchell, 
Women's Estate (1972). 
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women equal opportunities." Images and fictional text are not 
the same thing as subordinating conduct. The ordinance does 
not target discriminatory actions denying access to jobs, educa-
tion, public accommodations, or real property. It prohibits 
images. Although ideas have impact, images of discrimination 
are not the discrimination. 
Further, the ordinance is cast in a form very different from 
the traditional antidiscrimination principles embodied in the 
Constitution and federal civil rights laws. Antidiscrimination 
laws demand equality of treatment for men and women, blacks 
and whites. The ordinance, by contrast, purports to protect 
women. It assumes that women are subordinated by sexual 
images and that men act uncontrollably if exposed to them. Sex-
ist stereotypes are thus built into its very premises, and, as we 
demonstrate infra, its effect will be to reinforce those 
stereotypes. 
Hence, the District Court misperceived this case as one re-
quiring the assignment of rank in a constitutional hierarchy. It 
is not necessary to rule that either gender equality or free speech 
is more important. The ordinance is fatally flawed not only be-
cause it authorizes suppression of speech protected by the First 
Amendment but also because it violates the constitutional guar-
antee of sex-based equality. 
B. The Ordinance Classifies on the Basis of Sex and Perpetu-
ates Sexist StereotYPes. 
The ordinance defines pornography in gender specific terms as 
"the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women" that also 
presents "women" in particular ways proscribed by the law. The 
District Court found: 
[t]he Ordinance seeks to protect adult women, as a 
group, from the diminution of the legal and sociological 
status as women, that is from the discriminatory stigma 
which befalls women as women as a result of 
'pornography.' 
American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. at 1335 
(emphasis supplied). 
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The heart of the ordinance is the suppression of sexually ex-
plicit images of women, based on a finding of "subordination," a 
term which is not defined. The ordinance implies that sexually 
explicit images of women necessarily subordinate and degrade 
women and perpetuates stereotypes of women as helpless vic-
tims and people who could not seek or enjoy sex. 
The ordinance also reinforces sexist stereotypes of men. It de-
nies the possibility that graphic sexually explicit images of a 
man could ever subordinate or degrade him. It provides no rem-
edy for sexually explicit images showing men as "dismembered, 
truncated or fragmented" or "shown as filthy or inferior, bleed-
ing, bruised or hurt." 
The stereotype that sex degrades women, but not men, is un-
derscored by the proviso that "the use of men, children, or 
transsexuals in the place of women ... also constitutes pornog-
raphy." Indianapolis, Ind., Code§ 16-3(q). The proviso does not 
allow men to claim that they, as men, are injured by sexually 
explicit images of them. Rather men are degraded only when 
they are used "in place of women." The ordinance assumes that 
in sexuality, degradation is a condition that attaches to women. 26 
The ordinance authorizes any woman to file a complaint 
against those trafficking in pornography "as a woman acting 
against the subordination of women." A man, by contrast, may 
obtain relief only if he can "prove injury in the same way that a 
woman is injured." Indianapolis, Ind., Code § 16-17(a)(7)(b). 
Again the ordinance assumes that women as a class are subordi-
nated and hurt by depictions of sex, and men are not. 
The ordinance reinforces yet another sexist stereotype of men 
as aggressive beasts. Appellants assert: 
By conditioning the male orgasm to female subordina-
tion, pornography . . . makes the subordination of 
women pleasurable and seemingly legitimate. Each time 
men are sexually aroused by pornography, they learn to 
connect a woman's sexual pleasure to abuse and a wo-
man's sexual nature to inferiority. They learn this in 
their bodies, not just their minds, so that it becomes a 
26. Appellants explain that the proviso is needed because "without it, pornographers 
could circumvent the ordinance by producing the exact same material using models 
other than adult biological females, i.e., men, children, and transsexuals, to portray 
women." Appellants' brief at 45. 
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natural physiological response. At this point pornography 
leaves no more room for further debate than does shout-
ing "kill" to an attack dog. 
Appellants' brief at 21. 
127 
Men are not attack dogs, but morally responsible human be-
ings. The ordinance reinforces a destructive sexist stereotype of 
men as irresponsible beasts, with "natural physiological re-
sponses" which can be triggered by sexually explicit images of 
women, and for which the men cannot be held accountable. 
Thus, men are conditioned into violent acts or negative beliefs 
by sexual images; women are not. Further, the ordinance is 
wholly blind to the possibility that men could be hurt and de-
graded by images presenting them as violent or sadistic. 
The ordinance also reinforces sexist images of women as inca-
pable of consent. It creates a remedy for people "coerced" to 
participate in the production of pornography. Unlike existing 
criminal, tort, and contract remedies against coercion, the ordi-
nance provides: 
proof of the following facts or conditions shall not consti-
tute a defense: that the person actually consented . . .; 
or, knew that the purpose of the acts or events in ques-
tion was to make pornography; or demonstrated no resis-
tance or appeared to cooperate actively in the photo-
graphic sessions or in the sexual events that produced the 
pornography; or . . . signed a contract, or made state-
ments affirming a willingness to cooperate in the produc-
tion of pornography. 
Indianapolis, Ind., Code § 16-3.(5)(A) VIII-XI. 
In effect, the ordinance creates a strong presumption that 
women who participate in the creation of sexually explicit mate-
rial are coerced.27 A woman's manifestation of consent-no mat-
ter how plain, informed, or even self-initiated-does not consti-
tute a defense to her subsequent claim of coercion. Women are 
judged incompetent to consent to participation in the creation of 
sexually explicit material and condemned as "bad" if they do so. 
27. The provisions negating common law defenses to coercion are cast in facially neu-
tral terms. But since "pornography" is defined in gender specific terms, the provisions 
abrogating defenses to coercion also apply to women or to others used "in the place of 
women." 
28 
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Appellants argue that this provision is justified by Supreme 
Court precedent allowing suppression of sexually explicit mate-
rial involving children. They assert that women, like children, 
"are incapable of consenting to engage in pornographic conduct, 
even absent a showing of physical coercion and therefore require 
special protection. . . . The coercive conditions under which 
most pornographic models work make this part of the law one 
effective address to the industry." [Sic.] Appellants' brief at 17. 
This provision does far more than simply provide a remedy to 
women who are pressured into the creation of pornography 
which they subsequently seek to suppress. It functions to make 
all women incompetent to enter into legally binding contracts 
for the production of sexually explicit material. When women 
are legally disabled from making binding agreements, they are 
denied power to negotiate for fair treatment and decent pay. En-
forcement of the ordinance would drive production of sexually 
explicit material even further into an underground economy, 
where the working conditions of women in the sex industry 
would worsen, not improve. 
C. The Ordinance Is Unconstitutional Because It Reinforces 
Sexist Stereotypes and Classifies on the Basis of Sex. 
In recent years, the Supreme Court has firmly and repeatedly 
rejected gender-based classifications, such as that embodied in 
the ordinance. The constitutionally protected right to sex-based 
equality under law demands that: 
the party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies indi-
viduals on the basis of their gender must carry the bur-
den of showing an "exceedingly persuasive justification" 
for the classification. . . . The burden is met only by 
showing at least that the classification serves "important 
governmental objectives and that the discriminatory 
means employed" are "substantially related to the 
achievement of those objectives." 
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 
(1982). 
The sex-based classifications embodied in the statute are jus-
tified on the basis of stereotypical assumptions about women's 
29 
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vulnerability to sexually explicit images and their production 
and men's latent uncontrollability. But the Supreme Court has 
held that, "[This standard] must be applied free of fixed notions 
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females. Care 
must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective 
itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions." Id. Gender-based 
classifications cannot be upheld if they are premised on " 'old 
notions' and 'archaic and overbroad' generalizations" about the 
roles and relative abilities of men and women." Califano v. Gold-
farb, 430 U.S. 199, 217 (1977). 
-The ordinance damages individuals who do not fit the stereo-
types it embodies. It delegitimates and makes socially invisible 
women who find sexually explicit images of women "in positions 
of display" or "penetrated by objects" to be erotic, liberating, or 
educational. These women are told that their perceptions are a 
product of "false consciousness" and that such images are so in-
herently degrading that they may be suppressed by the state. At 
the same time, it stamps the imprimatur of state approval ori 
the belief that men are attack dogs triggered to violence by the 
sight of a sexually explicit image of a woman. It delegitimates 
and makes socially invisible those men who consider themselves 
gentle, respectful of women, or inhibited about expressing their 
sexuality. 
Even worse, the stereotypes of the ordinance perpetuate tradi-
tional social views of sex-based difference. By defining sexually 
explicit images of woman as subordinating and degrading to 
them, the ordinance reinforces the stereotypical view that 
"good" women do not seek and enjoy sex.28 As applied, it would 
deny women access to sexually explicit material at a time in our 
28. Perpetuating the stereotype that "good girls" do not enjoy sex, and suppressing 
images of women's sexuality, is particularly tragic for teenagers. A recent study by the 
prestigious Alan Guttmacher Institute identifies factors explaining why teenagers in the 
United States experience unwanted pregnancy at rates significantly higher than those in 
any other developed nation. This extensive study found that the single most important 
factor associated with low rates of unwanted pregnancy is "openness about sex (defined 
on the basis of four items: media presentations of female nudity, the extent of nudity on 
public beaches, sales of sexually explicit literature and media advertising of condoms)." 
The researchers conclude: 
American teenagers seem to have inherited the worst of all possible worlds re-
garding their exposure to messages about sex: Movies, music, radio and TV tell 
them that sex is romantic, exciting, titillating .... Yet, at the same time, young 
people get the message good girls should say no. Almost nothing that they see or 
hear about sex informs them about contraception or the importance of avoiding 
pregnancy .... Such messages lead to an ambivalence about sex that stifles 
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history when women have just begun to acquire the social and 
economic power to develop our own images of sexuality. Stereo-
types of hair-trigger male susceptibility to violent imagery can 
be invoked as an excuse to avoid directly blaming the men who 
commit violent acts. 
Finally, the ordinance perpetuates a stereotype of women as 
helpless victims, incapable of consent, and in need of protection. 
A core premise of contemporary sex equality doctrine is that if 
the objective of the law is to " 'protect' members of one gender 
because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap 
or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate." 
Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725. We have 
learned through hard experience that gender-based classifica-
tions protecting women from their own presumed innate vulner-
ability reflect "an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in 
practical e:ff ect, puts women not on a pedestal but in a cage." 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973). 
The coercion provisions of the ordinance "protect" by denying 
women's capacity to voluntarily agree to participate in the crea-
tion of sexually explicit images. The trafficking provisions "pro-
tect" by allowing women to suppress sexually explicit speech 
which the ordinance presumes is damaging to them. The claim 
that women need protection and are incapable of voluntary ac-
tion is familiar. Historically, the presumed "natural and proper 
timidity and delicacy" of women made them unfit "for many of 
the occupations of civil life," and justified denying them the 
power to contract. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 
141-42 (1872). 
Until quite recently, the law commonly provided women spe-
cial protections against exploitation. In 1936, the Supreme Court 
upheld a law establishing minimum wages for women saying, 
"What can be closer to the public interest than the health of 
women and their protection from unscrupulous and overreaching 
employers?" West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398 
(1936). In 1948, the Court approved a law banning women from 
work as bartenders as a legitimate measure to combat the 
communication and exposes young people to increased risk of pregnancy, out-of-
wedlock births and abortions. 
Jones, Forrest, Goldman, Heusbaw, Livecloer, Rosoff, Westoff, & Wolf, Teenage Preg-
nancy in Developed Countries: Determinants and Policy Implications, 17 Family Plan. 
Persp., Mar.-Apr. 1985, at 53, 61. 
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"moral and social problems" to which bartending by women 
might give rise. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948). The 
protectionist premise of these cases is now discredited and their 
holdings repudiated. 
Women were, and continue to be, in a position of social and 
economic vulnerability that inhibits their ability to negotiate 
fair terms and conditions of wage labor. Further, the pervasive 
sexism and violence of our culture make women vulnerable to 
exploitation and inhibit their ability to enter into sexual or other 
relationships on a free and voluntary basis. 
Slavery and free self-actualization are opposite poles on a con-
tinuum. Both free agency and response to external pressure are 
simultaneous aspects of human action. In the 1930's, employers 
challenged minimum wage and hour laws saying that laborers 
"freely consented" to work twelve hours a day, under dangerous 
and harmful conditions, for wages that did not provide minimal 
subsistence. We understand today that this concept of voluntary 
consent is self-serving and empty. Similarly, many women en-
gage in sex or in the production of sexually explicit materials in 
response to pressures so powerful that it would be cynical to 
characterize their actions as simply voluntary and consensual . 
. Still, the laws that "protected" only women from exploitation 
in wage labor hurt them. B. Babcock, A. Freedman, E. Norton & 
S. Ross, supra p. 25, at 48, 191-217. Many employers responded 
by barring women from the best paying jobs with the greatest 
opportunity for advancement. Further, the protective labor laws 
reinforced general beliefs about women's vulnerability and in-
competence. Similarly here, the protection of the ordinance rein-
forces the idea that women are incompetent, particularly in rela-
tion to sex. 
The pervasive sexism and violence of our culture create a so-
cial climate-in the home, workplace, and street-that is differ-
ent for women than for men. But even accurate generalizations 
about women's need for help do not justify sex-based classifica-
tions such as those in this ordinance. It is also true that women 
generally are still the ones who nurture young children. Yet we 
understand that laws giving mothers an irrebuttable "tender 
years" presumption for custody, or offering child rearing leaves 
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only to mothers but not to fathers, ultimately hurt women and 
are unconstitutional. 29 
Some of the proponents of the ordinance believe that it will 
empower women, while others support it for more traditional, 
patriarchal reasons. Supra note 22. But many gender-based clas-
sifications are premised· on a good faith intent to help or protect 
women. Good intent does not justify an otherwise invidious gen-
der-based law. "Our nation has had a long and unfortunate his-
tory of sex discrimination." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. at 
684. The clearest lesson of that history is that sex-based classifi-
cations hurt women. 
Thus, the District Court was correct to reject Appellants' 
claim that women are like children who need special protection 
from sexually explicit material. The Court found that: 
adult women as a group do not, as a matter of public pol-
icy or applicable law, stand in need of the same type of 
protection which has long been afforded children. . . . 
Adult women generally have the capacity to protect 
themselves from participating in and being personally 
victimized by pornography . . . . 
American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. at 1333-34. 
The gender-based classification embodied in the ordinance is 
unconstitutional because it assumes and perpetuates classic sex-
ist concepts of separate gender-defined roles, which carry "the 
inherent risk of reinforcing the stereotypes about the 'proper 
place' of women and their need for special protection." Orr v. 
Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979). 
29. On the dangers and unconstitutionality of a blanket "tender years" presumption, 
see Devine v. Devine, 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981); Developments in the Law: The Consti-
tution and the Family, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1156, 1334-38 (1980); S. Ross & A. Barcher, The 
Rights of Women 229-30 (1983). On the danger and illegality of a mother-only child 
rearing leave, see Danielson v. Board of Higher Educ., 358 F. Supp. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
See also Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (company policy prohib-
iting the hiring of mothers, but not fathers, of preschool-aged children violates section 
703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Williams, Reflections on Culture, 
Courts and Feminism, 7 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 175, 198 (1982). 
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D. The Sex-Based Classification and Stereotypes Created by 
the Ordinance Are Not Carefully Tailored to Serve Impor-
tant State Purposes. 
Appellants claim that the ordinance serves the "governmental 
interest in promoting sex equality." Appellants' brief at 23. Cer-
tainly preventing the violent subordination of women is the sort 
of compelling public purpose that might justify sex-based classi-
fication. But, as is often true of classifications justified on 
grounds that they protect women, the benefits actually provided 
are minimal. The ordinance thus also fails the requirement for a 
"substantial relationship" between its classification and the 
achievement of its asserted goal. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. 
Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724. 
Supporters of the ordinance describe acts of violence against 
women and claim that the ordinance would provide a remedy for 
those injuries. But the only new remedy it provides is suppres-
sion of sexually explicit materials, a wholly inadequate and mis-
directed ·response to real violence. 
Amicus Marchiano, for example, has written of her marriage 
to a man who beat her, raped her, forced her into prostitution, 
and terrorized her. L. Lovelace, Ordeal (1980). For several years 
prior to the making of Deep Throat, she was virtually impris-
oned by her husband through brute force, control of economic 
resources, and the fact that she believed his claim that a wife 
could not charge her husband with a crime. Id. at 82. Had this 
ordinance existed then, it would not have helped her. There is a 
compelling social need to provide more effective remedies for 
victims of violence and sexual coercion. But the ordinance does 
not protect vulnerable people against those actions already pro-
hibited by the criminal law. Those who have worked to empower 
battered women and children understand that effective enforce-
ment of existing criminal sanctions demands a multipronged ef-
fort. Police and prosecutors must be trained, required to take 
complaints seriously, and given the resources to do so. Bruno v. 
McGuire, 4 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 3095 (1978). Help must be 
available on a continuous and prompt basis. A. Boylan & N. 
Taub, Adult Domestic Violence: Constitutional, Legislative and 
Equitable Issues (1981). Vulnerable people must be educated 
and provided support by community groups and shelters. L. 
Bowker, Beating Wife Beating (1982). See generally S. 
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Schechter, Women and Male Violence: The Visions and Strug-
gles of the Battered Women's Movement (1982); Marcus, Conju-
gal Violence: The Law of Force and the Force of Law, 69 Calif. 
L. Rev. 1657 (1981). The remedy this ordinance provides for vio-
lence and sexual coercion is illusory. 
Individuals who commit acts of violence must be held legally 
and morally accountable. The law should not displace responsi-
bility onto imagery. Amicus Women Against Pornography de-
scribe as victims of pornography married women coerced to per-
form sexual acts depicted in pornographic works, working 
women harassed on the job with pornographic images, and chil-
dren who have pornography forced on them during acts of child 
abuse. Appellants' brief at 13. Each of these examples describes 
victims of violence and coercion, not of images. The acts are 
wrong, whether or not the perpetrator refers to an image. The 
most wholesome sex education materials, if shown to a young 
child as an example of what people do with those they love, 
could be used in a viciously harmful way. The law should punish 
the abuser, not the image. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act pro-
vides remedies for working women injured by sexual taunts or 
slurs, including sexually explicit pictures, ~. Barnes v. Costle, 
561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977), and for those injured by misogy-
nist imagery. See, e.g., Kyriazi v. Western Elec. Co., 461 F. Supp. 
892 (D.N.J. 1978). These legal principles apply to any images or 
texts which people put to discriminatory use, whether pornogra-
phy or the Bible. But no law has or should assume that the same 
woman harassed by pornographic images in the work place 
might not enjoy those very images if given the opportunity to 
put them to her own use. 
To resist forced sex and violence, women need the material 
resources to enable them to reject jobs or marriages in which 
they are abused or assaulted and the internal and collective 
strength to fight the conditions of abuse. The ordinance does 
nothing to enhance the concrete economic and social power of 
women. Further, its stereotype of women as powerless victims 
undermines women's ability to act affirmatively to protect 
themselves. 
Suppression of sexually explicit material will not eliminate the 
pervasive sexist images of the mainstream culture or the dis-
criminatory economic and social treatment that maintains 
women's second class status. Such suppression will not empower 
women to enter into sexual relationships on a voluntary, consen-
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sual basis. Empowering women requires something more than 
suppression of texts and images. It demands "concrete material 
changes that enable women and men to experience sexuality less 
attached to and formed by gender."30 These changes include so-
cial and economic equality; access to jobs, day care and educa-
tion; more equal sharing of responsibility for children; recogni-
tion of the social and economic value of the work that women 
have traditionally done in the home; and access to birth control, 
abortion, and sex education. 
Ill CONCLUSION 
Sexually explicit speech is not per se sexist or harmful to 
women. Like any mode of expression, it can be used to attack 
women's struggle for equal rights, but it is also a category of 
speech from which women have been excluded. The suppression 
authorized by the Indianapolis ordinance of a potentially enor-
mous range of sexual imagery and texts reinforces the notion 
that women are too fragile, and men too uncontrollable, absent 
the aid of the censor, to be trusted to reject or enjoy sexually 
explicit speech for themselves. By identifying "subordination of 
women" as the concept that distinguishes sexually explicit mate-
rial which is tolerable from that to be condemned, the ordinance 
incorporates a vague and asymmetric standard for censorship 
that can as readily be used to curtail feminist speech about sex-
uality, or to target the speech of sexual minorities, as to halt 
hateful speech about women. Worse, perpetuation of the concept 
of gender-determined roles in regard to sexuality strengthens 
one of the main obstacles to achieving real change and ending 
sexual violence. 
30. Vance & Snitow, Toward a Conversation About Sex in Feminism: A Modest Pro-
posal, 10 Signs: J. of Women in Culture and Soc. 126, 131 (1984). 
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Amici therefore ask this Court to affirm the judgment below. 
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